Why this matters now: A sitting president just floated restarting U.S. nuclear explosive testing for the first time in more than three decades. That is not a technical tweak; it is a geopolitical shock with safety, legal, and moral stakes. The claim: if Russia is testing exotic nuclear-powered weapons, America should detonate a bomb underground. What's being glossed over? The U.S. weapons stockpile is already certified without explosive tests, the risks to communities are real, and the biggest winner of a test could be rival states racing to catch up. Read the source reporting: NPR: Trump says he wants to resume nuclear testing.

  • Bottom line: Testing a nuclear device is not required to maintain deterrence—and could make America less safe.
  • Ignored voices: Nevadans, downwinders, and Indigenous communities who would shoulder the risks.
  • Unasked question: Why trade proven science-based stewardship for a symbolic blast that undercuts U.S. leadership on arms control?

Why It Matters

How we got here

  • Decades-long moratorium: After the Cold War, major nuclear powers observed a halt to explosive testing. The U.S. conducted its last test in 1992; Russia in 1990; China in 1996.
  • Treaty landscape: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions. The U.S. has signed but not ratified; still, it has observed a voluntary moratorium for over 30 years. See CTBTO.
  • Stockpile stewardship works: U.S. labs certify warhead reliability via experiments and supercomputers, not blasts. The National Nuclear Security Administration details this science-based approach here: NNSA: Maintaining the Stockpile. NPR's tour of the NNSS non-explosive test tunnels reported lab confidence that no explosive test is needed to answer current system questions.
  • Site and risks: Any U.S. test would be at the Nevada National Security Site. Past underground tests sometimes leaked radioactivity; detonations can produce felt earthquakes across the region. Communities historically exposed to fallout—often called downwinders—have documented health burdens. See the National Cancer Institute on fallout and iodine-131 exposure: NCI overview.
  • Arms race dynamics: Testing historically signaled technological one-upmanship. Wolfsthal (FAS) notes the parallels to Cold War cycles of test-deploy-invest escalation. See FAS and NTI for primer resources.

Hinderstein (Carnegie): resuming testing would be extremely dangerous and likely benefit adversaries more than the U.S.

Los Alamos scientist (via NPR): there are no system-level questions whose answers justify the expense and delay of an explosive test.

What Happened

What happened

  • Who: President Donald Trump; experts including Corey Hinderstein (Carnegie), Robert Peters (Heritage), Paul Dean (NTI), and Jon Wolfsthal (FAS) quoted by NPR.
  • What: Announced intent for the U.S. to resume nuclear explosive testing for the first time since 1992, framing it as a response to other nations' activities.
  • When: Public remarks on Thursday, Oct 30, 2025.
  • Where: Comments aboard Air Force One; any U.S. test would occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), ~60 miles northwest of Las Vegas.
  • Why: Cited Russian testing of nuclear-powered delivery systems as justification; signaled a need to match perceived adversary activity.

Key details from experts

  • Underground tests would be conducted in deep shafts; historical leaks of radioactivity and significant seismic shaking are possible—even in Las Vegas high-rises.
  • The U.S. last tested in 1992; Russia in 1990; China in 1996. A basic demonstration could be staged in ~18 months, but a scientifically useful test would likely take years.
  • Cost estimates: roughly $140 million per test (NTI's Paul Dean), excluding long-tail environmental and health costs.
  • Analysts warn resuming tests could ignite a new arms race, especially with the last major U.S.-Russia treaty nearing expiration, per FAS's Wolfsthal.

A Closer Look

The proposed return to explosive testing looks less like prudent deterrence and more like performative escalation. It conflates two distinct things: Russia's testing of nuclear-powered delivery systems (dangerous and provocative) and the U.S. need to explode a warhead to validate reliability. U.S. labs already validate without blasts; detonating a device underground would add risk, cost, and diplomatic damage while providing thin technical gain.

Testing would hand authoritarian rivals an excuse to follow suit—and to claim that Washington killed the norm. It would undercut U.S. credibility to pressure others not to test, invite reciprocal testing by emerging nuclear states, and complicate efforts to extend or replace expiring treaties. At home, the burdens—seismic risk, contamination potential, financial outlays—would fall on communities far from the photo ops.

Questions we should demand answers to

  • If labs say explosive testing is not needed, what specific, testable technical question cannot be answered via stewardship tools?
  • What is the full lifecycle cost (site prep, containment, environmental remediation, health monitoring), not just a per-shot price tag?
  • How will the administration obtain informed consent from affected communities, including Nevadans, downwinders, and Indigenous peoples with ties to the test site region?
  • What is the diplomatic plan to prevent a cascade of copycat tests and preserve remaining arms control constraints?
  • Will any test be subject to independent oversight, transparent environmental review, and real-time public reporting of seismic and radiological data?

Ignored voices

  • Nevadans and Las Vegas residents who face seismic and reputational risk.
  • Downwinder families with multigenerational health impacts seeking recognition and care.
  • Indigenous communities historically marginalized in nuclear decision-making.
  • Nuclear scientists and nonproliferation experts warning that a test would benefit adversaries more than the U.S.

Call to Action

What you can do

  • Read and share the source reporting: NPR coverage.
  • Contact your representatives: Oppose resumption of explosive testing; support ratification of the CTBT and robust oversight of the NNSA.
  • Stand with impacted communities: Support downwinder health monitoring and compensation programs (see DOJ RECA info: RECA).
  • Demand transparency: Call for full environmental review, independent monitoring, and public release of seismic/radiological data before any test.
  • Stay informed: Follow experts at FAS, NTI, and Carnegie.

Your voice matters. The norm against nuclear testing is only as strong as the public is willing to defend it.

From Silence to Sound

Silence to Sound exists to elevate facts that power would rather leave unexamined. On nuclear testing, clear thinking and civic courage matter more than chest-thumping. Speaking up against unnecessary, high-risk spectacles is not softness—it is principled stewardship of public safety, democratic oversight, and global stability. Resisting fear-driven escalation and insisting on transparent, evidence-based policy aligns with our mission to challenge authoritarian impulses and protect the communities most affected yet least heard.